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The low levels of nominal interest rates experienced over the last years in
major world economies has generated considerable interest in how mone-
tary policy should be conducted in the presence of a zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates. Nevertheless, there exists no rigorous treatment of
the optimal policy design problem under the standard conditions of uncer-
tainty and rational expectations. Intuition on how monetary policy should
be conducted had to be built from models without bound (e.g., Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003)), or from models with the bound
but either deterministic (e.g., Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005) and
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)) or with backward-looking expectations
(e.g., Kato and Nishiyama (2005)).
This paper studies optimal monetary policy under commitment in a sto-
chastic and forward-looking New Keynesian model along the lines of Clarida,
Galí and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003), but takes explicitly into ac-
count that nominal interest rates cannot be set to negative values.1
In our model the lower bound on nominal interest rates will occasionally
be reached due to adverse shocks hitting the economy.2 As a result, we are
able to study how monetary policy should be conducted when interest rates
are still positive but there is the possibility of reaching the lower bound
in the near future. In addition, having a fully stochastic setup allows us
to calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and to assess the quantitative
implications of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
Two qualitatively new features of optimal policy emerge from our analy-
sis.
First, we ﬁnd that nominal interest rates may have to be lowered more
aggressively in response to shocks than what is instead suggested by a model
without lower bound. Such ‘preemptive’ easing of nominal rates is optimal
because agents anticipate the possibility of shocks leading to zero nominal
1In principle negative nominal rates are feasible, e.g., if one is willing to give up free
convertability of deposits and other ﬁnancial assets into cash or if one could levy a tax on
money holdings, see Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) and Goodfriend (2000). However,
there seems to be no general consensus on the applicability of such policy measures.
2Private agents will rationally anticipate this possibility.
1rates in the future and reduce already today their output and inﬂation expec-
tations correspondingly.3 Such expectations end up amplifying the adverse
eﬀects of shocks and thereby trigger a stronger policy response. A similar
ﬁnding for backward-looking models is reported by Kato and Nishiyama
(2005) and Orphanides and Wieland (2000).
Second, the presence of shocks that lead to zero nominal rates alters also
the optimal policy response to non-binding shocks. This occurs because the
policymaker cannot aﬀect the average real interest rate in any stationary
equilibrium, therefore, faces a ‘global’ policy constraint. The inability to
lower nominal and real interest rates as much as desired requires that optimal
policy increases rates less (or lowers rates more) in response to non-binding
shocks, compared to the policy that would instead be optimal in the absence
of the lower bound.
There are also a number of quantitative results regarding optimal mon-
etary policy for the U.S. economy emerging from this analysis.
First, the zero lower bound appears inessential in dealing with mark-up
shocks, i.e., variations over time in the degree of monopolistic competition
between ﬁrms.4 More precisely, the empirical magnitude of mark-up shocks
observable in the U.S. economy for the period 1983-2002 is too small for
the lower bound on nominal rates to be reached. This would remain the
case even if the true variance of mark-up shocks were threefold above our
estimated value.
Second, the shocks to the ‘natural’ real rate of interest may cause zero
nominal rates, but this happens relatively infrequently and is a feature of
optimal policy.5 Based on our estimates for the 1983-2002 period, in the
U.S. economy the bound would be reached on average one quarter every 17
years under optimal policy. Once zero nominal interest rates are observed,
they are expected to endure not more than 1 to 2 quarters. Moreover, the
average welfare losses entailed by the zero lower bound seem to be rather
small.
3Expectations are reduced because once the lower bound is reached inﬂation and output
become negative.
4These shocks are often called ‘cost-push’ shocks, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999).
5The natural real rate is the real interest rate associated with the optimal use of
productive resources under ﬂexible prices.
2The latter results, however, are sensitive to the size of the standard
deviation of the estimated natural real rate process. In particular, we ﬁnd
that zero nominal rates would occur much more frequently and generate
higher welfare losses if the real rate process had a somewhat larger variance.
Third, as argued by Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005) and Eggerts-
son and Woodford (2003) optimal policy reacts to zero nominal interest rates
by generating inﬂationary expectations in the form of a commitment to let
future output gaps and inﬂation rates increase above zero. The policymaker
thereby eﬀectively lowers the real interest rates that agents are confronted
with.
Since reducing real rates using inﬂa t i o np r o m i s e si sc o s t l y( i nw e l f a r e
terms), the policymaker has to trade-oﬀ the welfare losses generated by too
high real rates with those stemming from higher inﬂation rates. We ﬁnd
that the required levels of inﬂation and the associated positive output gap
are very moderate. A negative 3 standard deviation shock to the natural
real rate requires a promise of an increase in the annual inﬂation rate in the
order of 15 basis points and a positive output gap of roughly 0.5%.
Finally, while the optimal policy response to shocks through the promise
of above average output and inﬂation may in principal generate a ‘commit-
ment bias’, the quantitative eﬀects turn out to be negligible. This holds not
only for our baseline calibration but also for a range of alternative model
parameterizations that we look at. It suggests that optimal policy for the
U.S. economy implements an average inﬂa t i o nr a t eo fz e r oe v e nw h e nt a k i n g
directly into account the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.6
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy
discusses the related literature. Thereafter, section 3 introduces the model
and the policy problem. Section 4 presents our calibration for the U.S.
economy. The solution method we employ is described in section 5. Section
6 presents the main results. We then discuss in section 7 the robustness of
our ﬁndings to various parameter changes, and brieﬂy conclude in section 8.
Our strategy for identifying the historical shocks and numerical algorithm
are discussed in the appendix.
6Zero inﬂation is optimal because it minimizes the price dispersion between ﬁrms with
sticky prices and we abstract from the money demand distortions associated with positive
nominal interest rates.
32 Related Literature
A number of recent papers study the implications of the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates for optimal monetary policy.
Most closely related is Kato and Nishiyama (2005) who consider a sto-
chastic backward-looking model with an occasionally binding zero lower
bound constraint. Jung et al. (2005) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
consider forward-looking models under perfect foresight and analytically de-
rive optimal targeting rules.7 In this paper we consider instead a fully sto-
chastic setup which requires solving the model numerically to obtain the
rational expectations equilibrium.
A related set of papers focuses on optimal monetary policy in the absence
of credibility. In a companion paper of ours, Adam and Billi (2004), we
derive the optimal discretionary policy with zero lower bound in a stochastic
forward-looking model. Eggertsson (2005) analyzes discretionary policy and
the role of nominal debt policy as a way to achieve credibility.
The performance of simple monetary policy rules is examined by Fuhrer
and Madigan (1997), Wolman (2005), and Coenen, Orphanides and Wieland
(2004). A main ﬁnding of this set of papers is if the targeted inﬂation rate
is close enough to zero, simple policy rules formulated in terms of inﬂation
rates, e.g., the Taylor rule (1993), can generate signiﬁcant real distortions.
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Wolman (2005) show that simple pol-
icy rules formulated in terms of a price level target can considerably reduce
these real distortions. Benhabib et al. (2002) study the global properties
of Taylor-type rules showing that these might lead to self-fulﬁlling deﬂation
that converges to a low inﬂation or deﬂationary steady state. Evans and
Honkapohja (2005) study the properties of global Taylor rules under adap-
tive learning, showing the existence of an additional steady state with even
lower inﬂation rates.
7Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) also consider a simple stochastic setup where the
economy never falls into a liquidity trap: the economy is either unexpectedly in a situation
with zero nominal interest rates and reverts back to positive nominal rates with a ﬁxed
probability each period or it is in a situation where nominal rates are positive already and
the zero lower bound never binds in the future.
4The role of the exchange rate and monetary-base rules in overcoming the
adverse eﬀects of a binding lower bound on interest rates is analyzed, e.g.,
by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005), Coenen and Wieland (2003), McCallum
(2003), and Svensson (2003).8
3 The Monetary Policy Problem
We consider a simple and well-known monetary policy model of a represen-
tative consumer and ﬁrms in monopolistic competition facing restrictions
on the frequency of price adjustments (Calvo (1983)). Following Rotemberg
(1987), this is often referred to as the ‘New Keynesian’ model, that has fre-
quently been studied in the literature, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999)
and Woodford (2003).
We augment this otherwise standard monetary policy model by explicitly














πt = βEtπt+1 + κyt + ut (2)
yt = Etyt+1 − σ (it − Etπt+1)+gt (3)
it ≥− r∗ (4)
ut = ρuut−1 + εu,t (5)
gt = ρggt−1 + εg,t (6)
u0, g0 given (7)
where πt denotes the inﬂation rate, yt the output gap, and it the nominal
interest rate expressed as deviation from the interest rate consistent with
the zero inﬂation steady state.
Under certain conditions the monetary policy objective (1) can be in-
terpreted as a quadratic approximation to the utility of the representative
8Further articles dealing with the relevance of the zero lower bound can be found in
the special issues of the Journal of Japanese and International Economies Vol. 14, 2000
and the Journal of Money Credit and Banking Vol. 32 (4,2), 2000.




where θ>1 denotes the price elasticity of demand for the goods produced
by monopolistic ﬁrms. Equation (2) is a forward-looking Phillips curve
summarizing, up to ﬁrst order, proﬁt-maximizing price setting behavior by
ﬁrms, where β ∈ (0,1) denotes the discount factor and κ>0 is given by
κ =




with α ∈ (0,1) denoting the share of ﬁrms that cannot adjust prices in a
given period, σ>0 the household’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
and ω>0 the elasticity of a ﬁrm’s real marginal costs with respect to its
own output level.10 Equation (3) is a linearized Euler equation summarizing,
up to ﬁrst order, households’ intertemporal maximization. The shock gt
captures the variation in the ‘natural’ real interest rate and is usually referred
to as a real rate shock, i.e.,
gt = σ(rt − r∗) (8)
where the natural real rate rt is the real interest rate consistent with the
ﬂexible price equilibrium, and r∗ =1 /β −1 is the real rate of the determin-
istic zero inﬂation steady state.11 The requirement that nominal interest
rates have to remain positive is captured by constraint (4). Finally, equa-
tions (5) and (6) describe the evolution of the shocks, where ρj ∈ (−1,1)
and εj,t ∼ iiN(0,σ2
j)f o rj = u,g.12
3.1 How much non-linearity?
Instead of the fully nonlinear model, we study linear approximations to
ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁrst order conditions, i.e., equations (2) and (3),
9This requires steady output to be eﬃcient, e.g., thanks to the existence of an output
subsidy that neutralizes the distortions from monopolistic competition, and the output
gap to be deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the actual output level and the eﬃcient level,
see chapter 6 of Woodford (2003) for details.
10See chapter 3 in Woodford (2003) for further details.
11The shock gt summarizes all shocks that under ﬂexible prices generate time variation
in the real interest rate, therefore, it captures the combined eﬀects of preference shocks,
productivity shocks, and exogenous changes in government expenditure.
12As shown subsequently, this speciﬁcation of the shock processes is suﬃciently general
to describe the historical sequence of shocks in the U.S. economy for the period 1983:1-
2002:4 that we consider.
6respectively, and a quadratic approximation to the objective function, i.e.,
equation (1). This means that the only nonlinearity that we take account
of is the one imposed by the zero lower bound (4).13
Clearly, this modelling approach has advantages and disadvantages. One
disadvantage is that for the empirically relevant shock support and the esti-
mated value of the discount factor the linearizations (2) and (3) may perform
poorly at the lower bound. Yet, this depends on the degree of nonlinearity
present in the economy, an issue about which relatively little is empirically
known.
A paramount advantage of our approach is that one can economize in the
dimension of the state space. Higher-order approximations to the equilib-
rium conditions would require an additional state variable to keep track over
time of the higher-order eﬀects of price dispersion, as shown by Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2004). Computational costs would become prohibitive
with such an additional state.14 A further advantage of focusing solely on
the nonlinearities induced by the lower bound is that one does not have
to parameterize higher order terms when calibrating the model. This seem
important, given the lack of empirical evidence on this matter.
Finally, the simpler setup implies that our results remain more easily
comparable to the standard linear-quadratic analysis without lower bound
that appears in the literature, as the only diﬀerence consists of imposing
equation (4).
4 Calibration to U.S. Economy
To assess the quantitative importance of the zero lower bound for monetary
policy, we assign parameter values for the coeﬃcients appearing in equations
(1) to (6) by calibrating the model to the U.S. economy.
Table 1 summarizes our baseline parameterization. The values for α,θ,σ,ω
(and κ,λ) are taken from table 6.1 in Woodford (2003). The parameters of
13Technically, this approach is equivalent to linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions of the
nonlinear Ramsey problem around the ﬁrst best steady state except for the non-negativity
constraint for nominal interest rates, that is kept in its original nonlinear form.
14Our model has 4 state variables with continuous support and it takes already 39 hours
to obtain convergence on a Pentium 4 with 2.6 GHz.
7the shock processes and the discount factor are estimated using U.S. data for
the period 1983:1-2002:4, following the approach of Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1998). The implied steady state real interest rate for this parameteri-
zation is 3.5% annually. Details of the estimation and reasons for the sample
period chosen are given in appendix A.1.
The identiﬁed historical shock series are shown in ﬁgure 3. Mark-up
shocks do not display any signiﬁcant autocorrelation and have a standard
deviation of approximately 0.61% annually.15 R e a lr a t es h o c k s ,h o w e v e r ,a r e
rather persistent. As one would expect, the natural real rate seems to fall
during recessions, e.g., at the beginning of the 1990s and at the start of the
new millennium. The implied annual standard deviation of the natural real
rate, as implicitly deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 8 ) ,i se q u a lt o1.63% annually.16
The robustness of our ﬁndings to various assumptions regarding the pa-
rameterization of the model is considered in section 7.
5S o l v i n g t h e M o d e l
This section illustrates how we solve the optimal policy problem and derive
the associated rational expectations equilibrium. While some insights can
be gained from an analytical approach, the presence of forward-looking vari-
ables and of an occasionally binding constraint require to rely on numerical
solution methods. We ﬁrst describe our numercal solution approach and
then derive analytical results using ﬁrst order conditions.
5.1 Numerical solution approach
An important complication for solving the model is that the policymaker’s
maximization problem fails to be recursive, since constraints (2) and (3)
involve forward-looking variables. For this reason we cannot directly resort
to dynamic programming techniques. To obtain a dynamic programming
15This lack of autocorrelation contrasts with Ireland (2004) who uses data starting in
1948:1. Extending our sample back to this date would also lead to highly persistent mark-
up shocks. But our identiﬁcation of shocks requires the absence of structural breaks, so
we restrict attention to the shorter sample period.
16When using instead the period 1979:4-1995:2 as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998),
which includes the volatile years 1980-1982, we ﬁnd an annual standard deviation of 2.57%
for the natural real rate.
8formulation we rewrite the policy problem (1)-(7) by recursifying the La-
grangian of the inﬁnite horizon problem, as in Marcet and Marimon (1998).
This involves the following four steps. First, write down the Lagrangian
for problem (1)-(7) and let γ1
t and γ2
t denote the Lagrange multipliers for
constraints (2) and (3), respectively. Since these constraints are forward-
looking, some terms involve period t Lagrange multipliers γi
t (i =1 ,2)m u l -
tiplied by period t+1choice variables πt+1 and yt+1. Second, relabel the La-
grange multipliers in these terms as μi
t+1 and deﬁne the transition equations
μi
t+1 = γi




β (σπ0 + y0)
in period zero, deﬁning μi


















t (πt − κyt − ut) − μ1
tπt
+γ2















ut+1 = ρuut + εu,t+1




















t (πt − κyt − ut) − μ1
tπt
+γ2
t (−yt − σit + gt)+μ2
t
1
β (σπt + yt).
(11)
the iniﬁnite horizon problem (9) can be written in recursive form
W(μ1
t,μ 2

















9where optimization is subject to the set of constraints (10), which now in-
volve only backward-looking transition equations. Equation (12) is a gener-
alized Bellman equation, requiring maximization with respect to the controls
(yt,π t,i t) and minimization with respect to the Lagrange multipliers γ1
t ≶ 0
and γ2
t ≥ 0. In our numerical approach we approximate the value function
that solves the recursive functional equation (12) so to obtain the associated
optimal policy functions for (yt,π t,i t) and (γ1
t ,γ2
t ). The numerical algorithm
used is described in detail in appendix A.3.17
Note that the reformulated problem (12) has two additional state vari-
ables (μ1
t,μ 2
t), i.e., the lagged Lagrange multipliers, bringing the total num-
ber of state variables up to four. The additional states can be interpreted
as ‘promises’ that have to be kept from past commitments, leading to devi-
ations from purely forward-looking policy whenever their values diﬀer from
zero. This can be seen from the expression of the one-period return function
h(·) given by equation (11). In particular, −μ1
t + σ
βμ2
t > 0, e.g., indicates
a promise from past commitments to generate today higher inﬂation rates
than what purely forward-looking policy would imply. Likewise, 1
βμ2
t > 0
indicates a promise from past commitments to generate today larger output
gaps than what purely forward-looking policy suggests.18
5.2 Targeting rule
Some insights about the solution to the optimal policy problem can also be
gained from the ﬁrst-order conditions of problem (9). As shown in appendix















· (it + r∗)=0 (13)
which, provided it > −r∗, speciﬁes a relationship between current output,
inﬂation, and the lagged Lagrange multipliers that has to be satisﬁed under
optimal policy in equilibrium. Interestingly, this relationship is linear despite
the policy problem being nonlinear. For the case where the lower bound has
17Our solution approach is complementary to that of Christiano and Fisher (2000) and
Aiyagari et al. (2002), which uses the ﬁrst order conditions of problem (12) to solve for
the optimal policy functions.
18Clearly, inverting the signs of the inequalities implies inﬂation and output gap promises
of opposite direction.
10not been reached in any period j ≤ t, the targeting rule (13) simpliﬁes to19




This is the targeting rule derived, e.g., in Clarida at al. (1999) for a model
that abstracts from the existence of a lower bound. Even though this sim-
pliﬁed targeting rule (14) can describe optimal policy in a model either with
or abstracting from the lower bound, satisfying it might require setting in-
terest rates diﬀerently, depending on whether or not the model abstracts
from the bound. This is the case because inﬂation and output are forward-
looking processes. Expected future output and inﬂation depend on whether
or not the model accounts for the possibility of the zero nominal interest
rate constraint being binding in the future.
6 Optimal Policy with Lower Bound
This section describes the optimal policy with a lower bound on nominal
interest rates for the calibration to the U.S. economy shown in table 1.
Throughout the paper variables are exp r e s s e di nt e r m so fp e r c e n t a g ep o i n t
deviations from deterministic steady state values. Interest rates and inﬂation
rates are expressed in annualized percentage deviations, while the real rate
shock and the mark-up shock are stated in quarterly percentages.
6.1 Optimal Policy Functions
Figure 4 presents the optimal responses of (y,π,i) and the Lagrange mul-
tipliers (γ1,γ2) to both a mark-up shock and a real rate shock.20 The
responses of the Lagrange multipliers are of interest because they represent
commitments regarding future inﬂation rates and output gaps, as explained
in the previous section. Depicted are the optimal policy responses both for
the case of the zero lower bound being imposed in the model (solid line) and
for the case of interest rates allowed to become negative (dashed line with
circles).
19T h i si ss h o w ni na p p e n d i xA . 2 .
20The state variables not shown on the x-axes are set to their (unconditional) average
values. Policies are shown for a range of ±4 unconditional standard deviations of both
the mark-up shock and the real rate shock.
11The left-hand panel of ﬁgure 4 shows that the optimal response to mark-
up shocks is virtually unaﬀected by the presence of the zero lower bound.21
Independently of whether the bound is imposed or not in the model, a nega-
tive mark-up shock lowers inﬂation, increases output, and leads to a promise
of future inﬂation, as indicated by the values γ1
t < 0 and γ2
t =0(recall from
section 5.1 that −μ1
t+1 + σ
βμ2
t+1 > 0 implies higher inﬂation in t +1than
what purely forward-looking policy would suggest then). Future inﬂation
ameliorates the deﬂationary eﬀect of the shock through the expectational
channel present in equation (2). Overall, however, the required interest
rate changes in response to mark-up shocks are rather small, implying that
mark-up shocks do not plausibly lead to a binding lower bound.
The situation is quite diﬀerent if we consider the policy response to a real
rate shock, as depicted on the right-hand panel of ﬁgure 4. Without zero
lower bound in the model these shocks do not generate any policy trade-oﬀ:
the required real rate can be implemented through appropriate variations
in the nominal rate alone. Once the lower bound is considered, suﬃciently
negative real rate shocks cause the bound to be binding, so promising future
inﬂation remains the only instrument for implementing reductions in the
real rate. The values γ1
t < 0 and γ2




t+1 > 0) reveal that once the lower bound is
reached the policymaker indeed commits to future inﬂation as a substitute
for nominal rate cuts. Yet, inﬂation is a costly instrument (in welfare terms)
and it would be suboptimal to completely undo the output losses generated
by negative real rate shocks. As a result, there is a negative output gap,
some deﬂation, and nominal interest rates are at their lower bound. All
these features are generally associated with the concept of a ‘liquidity trap’.
Figure 5 depicts the optimal interest rate response to the current value
of the real rate shocks in greater detail. This reveals that nominal interest
rates have to be reduced more aggressively than is the case when nominal
rates are allowed to become negative.22 A stronger interest rate reduction is
21The optimal reaction to mark-up shocks is diﬀerent with or without the bound, but
the diﬀerence is quantiatively small for the calibrated parameter values. We will come
back to this point in section 6.4.
22Kato and Nishiyama (2005) found a similar eﬀect with a backward-looking AS curve,
which suggests that our result is robust to the introduction of lagged inﬂation terms into
the ‘New Keynesian’ AS curve. Using diﬀerent models, Orphanides and Wieland (2000)
12optimal because the possibility of additional shocks in the future generating
a binding lower bound places downward pressure on expected future out-
put and inﬂation, since these variables become negative once the bound is
reached, see the right-hand panel of ﬁgure 4. The reduced output and inﬂa-
tion expectations amplify the eﬀects of negative real rate shocks in equation
(3), thereby require that the policymaker lowers nominal rates faster. As
a result, zero nominal rates are reached much earlier than suggested by a
model without lower bound.
This ampliﬁcation eﬀect via private sector expectations points towards
an interesting complementarity between policy decisions and private sector
expectations formation, that may be of considerable importance for actual
policy making. Suppose, e.g., that agents suddenly assign a larger probabil-
ity to the lower bound being binding in the future. Since this lowers output
and inﬂation expectations, policy would reduce the nominal interest rate
and cause the economy to move into the direction of the expected change.
The existence of possible sunspot ﬂuctuations, however, is an issue that has
to be explored in future work.
6.2 Dynamic Response to Real Rate Shocks
Figure 6 displays the mean response of the economy to real rate shocks of
±3 unconditional standard deviations.23 With our baseline calibration of
table 1 the annual ‘natural’ real rate, i.e., the real interest rate consistent
with the eﬃcient use of productive resources, stands temporarily at +8.39%
and −1.39%, respectively; the interesting case being the one where full use
of productive resources requires a negative real rate.
As argued by Krugman (1998), negative real rates are plausible even
if the marginal product of physical capital remains positive. For instance
and Reifschneider and Williams (2000) also report more aggressive easing than in the
absence of the zero bound.
23Since in this nonlinear model certainty equivalence fails to hold, instead of the more
familiar deterministic impulse responses we discuss results in terms of the implied ‘mean
dynamics’ in response to shocks. The mean dynamics in this and other graphs are the
average responses computed for 10
5 stochastic simulations. The initial values for the other
states are set equal to their unconditional average values. Setting them to conditional
average values consistent with the real rate shock process does not make a noticeable
diﬀerence.
13agents may require a large equity premium, e.g., historically observed in the
U.S., or the price of physical capital may be expected to decrease.
Figure 6 shows that in response to a negative real rate shock annual inﬂa-
tion rises by about 15 basis points for up to 3 or 4 quarters and then returns
to a value close to zero. Similarly, output increases slightly above potential
from the second quarter and slowly returns to potential. Getting out of a
‘liquidity trap’ induced by negative real-rate shocks, therefore, requires that
the policymaker promises to let future output and inﬂation increase above
zero for a substantial amount of time.24 The qualitative feature of this ﬁnd-
ing is also reported in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and in a somewhat
diﬀerent way in Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005). Our results tend to clarify,
however, that the required amount of inﬂation and the output boom are
rather modest.
One should note that ex-post there would be strong incentives to increase
nominal interest rates earlier than promised, since this would bring both
inﬂation and output closer to their target values. The feasibility of the
optimal policy response, therefore, crucially depends on the policymaker’s
credibility. Whether policymakers can and may want to credibly commit to
such policies is currently subject of debate, e.g., Orphanides (2004).25
6.3 Frequency of Zero Nominal Rates and Welfare Implica-
tions
In this section we discuss the frequency with which zero nominal rates can
be expected and the related welfare implications.
For the calibration to the U.S. economy, under optimal policy zero nom-
inal interest rates occur rather infrequently, namely in about one quarter
every 17 years on average. Moreover, they tend to prevail for rather short
periods of time (roughly 1.4 quarters on average). Figure 7 displays the
probability with which zero nominal rates occur for n quarters, conditional






t > 0 and γ
2
t > 0,
respectively, see section 5.1.
25Interestingly, the Bank of Japan recently announced explicit macroeconomic condi-
t i o n st h a th a v et ob ef u l ﬁlled before it may consider abandoning its current zero interest
rate policy.
14on the nominal rate being at zero in quarter one. The likelihood that zero
nominal rates persist for more than 4 quarters is merely 1.8%.
Since the lower bound is reached rather infrequently, possible biases for
average output and inﬂation emerging from the nonlinear policy functions
are expected to be small. In fact, our simulations show that for the calibra-
tion at hand there are virtually no average level eﬀects for these variables.26
Finally, as one would expect, the average welfare eﬀects generated by
considering a zero lower bound in the model are rather small. The additional
welfare losses of the zero lower bound are roughly 1% of those generated by
the stickiness of prices alone.27 Since the zero lower bound is reached rather
infrequently, the conditional welfare losses associated with being at the lower
bound can nevertheless be quite substantial.
6.4 Global Implications of Binding Shocks
This section reports a qualitatively new ﬁnding that stems from the presence
of negative real rate shocks leading to zero nominal rates. It turns out that
these binding shocks alter the optimal policy response to non-binding shocks,
i.e., positive real rate shocks and mark-up shocks of both signs. In this sense,
the existence of a lower bound has ‘global’ implications on the shape of the
optimal policy functions.
For the baseline parameterization of the U.S. economy given in table 1,
however, these global eﬀects are quite weak, since the lower bound is reached
rather infrequently. To illustrate the global eﬀects, we thus assume in this
section that the variance σ2
g of the innovations εg,t is threefold that implied
by the baseline calibration.28
Figure 8 illustrates the mean response of the real rate to a ±3 standard
deviation real rate shock under optimal policy. The upper panel shows
26Average output and inﬂation deviate less than 0.01% from their steady state values.
27We compute unconditional welfare losses under optimal policy, evaluating objective
(1), both with and without lower bound in the model. Welfare losses are obtained averag-





their stationary distributions, each 1000 periods long.
28This value is roughly consistent with the estimated variability of real rate shocks
in the period 1979:4-1995:2, i.e., the time span considered by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998). In fact, the unconditional variance of the real rate shocks for 1979:4-1995:2 is
about 2.5-fold that for the period 1983:1-2002:4.
15the case with lower bound and the lower panel depicts the case without
bound in the model. While in the latter case the policy reaction is perfectly
symmetric, accounting for the bound creates a sizeable asymmetry: the real
rate reduction in response to a negative shock is much weaker than the
corresponding increase in response to a positive shock.29
Equation (3), however, implies that the policymaker is unable to aﬀect
the average real rate in any stationary equilibrium.30 Therefore, the less
strong real rate decrease for a binding real rate shock has to be compensated
with a less strong real rate increase (or a stronger real rate decrease) in
response to other shocks. A close look at ﬁgure 8 reveals that this is indeed
t h ec a s e :t h er e a lr a t ei n c r e a s ew i t ht he lower bound falls slightly short of
the one implemented without bound in the model.
Moreover, it is optimal to undo the asymmetry by trading-oﬀ across
all shocks, e.g., also across mark-up shocks. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 9
which plots the economy’s mean response to ±3 standard deviation mark-
up shocks. The left-hand panel illustrates the response when the zero lower
bound is considered and the right-hand panel depicts the case without bound
in the model. Clearly, the mean reactions change considerably once the lower
bound is accounted for. Real rates are now lowered more (increased less)
in response to negative (positive) mark-up shocks. This is the case even
though mark-up shocks do not lead to zero nominal rates.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
We now analyze the robustness of our ﬁndings to a number of variations in
our baseline calibration. Particular attention is given to the sensitivity of
the results to changes in the parameterization of the shock processes.
7.1 More Variable Shocks
We estimate the shock processes using data for a time period that most
economists would consider to be relatively ‘calm’ especially when confronted
29With negative shocks expected inﬂation has to be used to reduce the real interest rate
which is a costly instrument in welfare terms.
30This can be seen by taking unconditional expectations of equation (3), imposing sta-
tionarity, and noting that E[gt]=0 .
16with the more ‘turbulent’ 1960s and 1970s. Since one cannot exclude that
more turbulent times might lie ahead, it seems of interest to study the
implications of optimal policy with more variable mark-up and real rate
shocks. In this regard, this section considers the sensitivity of our ﬁndings
to an increase of the shock variances σ2
u and σ2
g above the values in table 1.
Increasing the variance of mark-up shocks we ﬁnd that the results are
remarkably stable. This holds even if setting the variance of σ2
u threefold
above its estimated value. Average output and (annual) inﬂation are vir-
tually unaﬀected. Moreover, zero nominal rates still occur with the same
frequency and persistence as for the baseline parameterization of table 1.
The picture changes somewhat increasing the variance of real rate shocks.
While average output remains virtually unaﬀected, average inﬂation and the
average frequency and persistence of zero nominal rates do change, albeit
to diﬀerent extents. This is illustrated in the ﬁrst three panels of ﬁgure 10,
that show the implications of increasing the variance of real rate shocks up
to threefold above that of the baseline calibration.31 Average inﬂation and
the average persistence of zero nominal rates change only in minor ways.
Instead, as real rate shocks become more variable, zero nominal rates occur
much more often.
Moreover, as can be observed in the lowest panel of ﬁgure 10, the addi-
tional welfare losses generated by considering the zero lower bound in the
model increase markedly with the variance of the real rate shock process.
While for the baseline calibration the additional average losses of the zero
lower bound over and above those generated by the stickiness of prices is in
the order of 1%, once the variance of real rate innovations is threefold the
additional losses surge to roughly 33%. This shows that the welfare eﬀects
of the zero lower bound are fairly sensitive to the variance of the assumed
real rate process.
One should note that the eﬀects of the variability of shocks on the average
level of output and inﬂation diﬀer considerably from those reported in earlier
contributions. Uhlig (2000), e.g., reports negative level eﬀects for both vari-
ables when analyzing optimal policy in a backward-looking model. Clearly,
31See footnote 28.
17the gains from promising positive values of future output and inﬂation can-
not show up in a backward-looking model. Similarly, Coenen, Orphanides
and Wieland (2004) report negative level eﬀects for a forward-looking model
considering Taylor-type interest rate rules, rather than optimal policy as in
this paper. Moreover, unlike suggested by Summers (1991), our results do
not justify that it is necessary to target positive inﬂation rates so as to
safeguard the economy against hitting the zero lower bound.
7.2 Lower Interest Rate Elasticity of Output
Our benchmark calibration of table 1 assumes an interest rate elasticity
of output of σ =6 .25, which seems to lie on the high side for plausible
estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.32 Therefore, we
also consider the case σ =1that corresponds to log utility in consumption,
and constitutes the usual benchmark parameterization in the real business
cycle literature. Table 2 presents the parameters values implied by assuming
σ =1instead of σ =6 .25. N o t et h a tt h ev a l u e so fκ and λ are also
changed, as they depend on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.33
To estimate the shock processes, we follow the same procedure as for the
baseline calibration. Details of the estimation are given in appendix A.4.
Overall, our ﬁndings seem robust to the change in the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. In particular, the level eﬀects on average output
and inﬂation remain negligible. Moreover, required inﬂa t i o ni nr e s p o n s et o
a negative 3 standard deviation real rate shock is still in the order of 15
basis points annually. Even more importantly, the additional welfare losses
generated by considering the zero bound in the model are rather small and
in the order of less than one-half percent of the losses generated by the
stickiness of prices alone.
Respect to the baseline, however, the lower bound is reached more fre-
quently, namely in about one quarter every 5 years on average. Zero nominal
rates occur more often because the variance of the real rate shock process
implied by the parameterization in table 2 is about 45% higher than in our
32As argued by Woodford (2003), a high elasticity value may capture non-modeled
interest-rate-sensitive investment demand.
33See equations (2.19) and (2.22) in chapter 6 of Woodford (2003).
18baseline.34 However, binding shocks now generate lower additional welfare
losses: the steeper slope κ of the Phillips curve implies that inﬂation reacts
more strongly to output. As a result, the required amount of inﬂation can
be generated with less positive output gaps, implying lower welfare losses.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we determine optimal monetary policy under commitment
taking directly into account the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
and assess its quantitative importance for the U.S. economy. One of the
main ﬁndings is that, given the historical properties of the estimated shock
processes for the U.S. economy, the zero lower bound seems neither to im-
pose large constraints on optimal monetary policy nor to generate large
additional welfare losses. Furthermore, we show that the existence of the
zero lower bound might require to lower nominal interest rates more aggres-
sively in response to adverse shocks than what is suggested instead by a
model without lower bound.
Our ﬁndings raise a number of further issues. First, the omission of ﬁscal
policy clearly constitutes a shortcoming; the study of the potential role of
ﬁscal policy in ameliorating adverse welfare eﬀects entailed by the lower
bound seems to be of interest. Second, given the widespread belief among
academics and practitioners that lagged inﬂation is a major determinant of
inﬂation, an issue that should be addressed is the robustness of our ﬁndings
to the introduction of lagged inﬂa t i o ni nt h eP h i l l i p sc u r v e .
Finally, the central bank’s credibility is key to our results. The use of
expected inﬂation is unavailable to a discretionary policymaker, as there
is no incentive to implement promised inﬂation ex-post. As a result, the
case for preemptive easing is even stronger with discretionary policy mak-
ing because the use of current interest rates is the only available policy
instrument. Consequently, the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is
binding more often and generates considerably higher welfare losses. This is
shown in a companion paper, see Adam and Billi (2004), where we analyze
the implications of relaxing the assumption of policy commitment.
34Mark-up shocks also play a less marginal role, a negative shock in the order of 4
standard deviations now leads to zero nominal rates.
19AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Identiﬁcation of historical shocks (baseline calibration)
To identify the historical shock processes we apply the procedure of Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1998). In particular, we ﬁrst construct output and
inﬂation expectations by estimating expectation functions from the data.
We plug these expectations along with actual values of the output gap and
inﬂation into equations (2) and (3), then identify the shocks ut and gt with
the equation residuals.
We measure the output gap by linearly detrended log real GDP, and
inﬂation by the log quarterly diﬀerence of the implicit deﬂator.35 Using
quadratically detrended GDP or HP(1600)-ﬁltered GDP leaves the esti-
mated parameters of the shock processes virtually unchanged. Detrended
output is depicted in ﬁgure 1. For the interest rate we use the quarterly
average of the fed funds rate in deviation from the average real rate for
the whole sample, which is approximately equal to 3.5% (in annual terms).
Based on this latter estimate we can set the quarterly discount factor as
s h o w ni nt a b l e1 .
The expectation terms in equations (2) and (3) are constructed from
the predictions of an unconstrained VAR in output, inﬂation, and the fed
funds rate with three lags. Estimating expectation functions in such a way
is justiﬁed as long as there are no structural breaks in the economy. Since
our sample period, 1983:1-2002:4, starts after the disinﬂation policy under
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, monetary policy is expected to
have been reasonably stable, see Clarida et al. (2000). A VAR lag order
selection test based on the Akaike information criterion for a maximum of
6 lags suggests the inclusion of 3 lags. A Wald lag exclusion test indicates
that the third lags are jointly signiﬁcant at the 2% level. The correlations of
the VAR residuals are depicted in ﬁgure 2. Substituting the expectations in
equations (2) and (3) with the VAR predictions one can identify the shocks
ut and gt. The implied shock series are shown in ﬁgure 3.
Fitting univariate AR(1) processes to these shocks delivers the following
35T h ed a t ai st a k e nf r o mt h ew e bs i t eo ft h eB u r e a uo fE c o n o m i cA n a l y s i s :w w w . b e a . g o v .
20OLS estimates:
ρu =0 .129 (0.113)
ρg =0 .919 (0.050)
σu =0 .153
σg =1 .091
where numbers in brackets indicate standard errors. A univariate AR(1)
describes the shock processes ut and gt quite well. In particular, there is no
signiﬁcant autocorrelation left in the innovations εi,t (i = u,g).M o r e o v e r ,
when estimating AR(2) processes the additional lags remain insigniﬁcant.
The estimated value of ρu is insigniﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance
levels. For this reason we set ρu =0and let the standard deviation of
the innovations εu,t match the standard deviation of the identiﬁed mark-up
shocks, which is approximately equal to 0.61% annually.
Although real rate shocks seem quite persistent, the persistence drops
considerably once one uses actual future values to identify output and in-
ﬂation expectations in equations (2) and (3), which amounts to assuming
perfect foresight. The estimated autoregressive coeﬃcient for the real rate
shocks then drops to ρg =0 .794, indicating that better forecasts than our
simple VAR-predictions would most likely lead to a reduction in the esti-
mated persistence. Moreover, when using VAR-predictions but considering
the period 1979:4-1995:2, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), the point
estimate falls to ρg =0 .827. For these reasons we set ρg =0 .8 in our calibra-
tion.36 The standard deviation σg of the innovations εg,t in table 1 equates
the unconditional standard deviation of the calibrated real shock process to
the standard deviation of the identiﬁed shock values.
36This value cannot be rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level when using estimates based
on the VAR-expectations. In an earlier version of this paper, which is available upon
request, we used instead the point estimates for ρu and ρg.
21A.2 Derivation of the targeting rule
Let L denote the Lagrangian stated in equation (9). The ﬁrst-order condi-
tions with respect to (yt,π t,i t) are then
∂L
∂yt


















· (it + r∗)=γ2
t · (it + r∗)=0 ,γ 2
t ≥ 0,i t ≥− r∗ (17)
Eliminating Lagrange multipliers (γ1
t ,γ2
t ) delivers the optimality condition
(13) stated in the text. If ij > −r∗ for all j ≤ t,f r o m( 1 7 )i tf o l l o w s
that γ2
j = μ2
j+1 =0( j ≤ t). Equation (15) for period t − 1 then implies
κ
2λμ1
t = −yt−1 and (13) simpliﬁes to (14).
A.3 Numerical algorithm
We use the collocation method to numerically approximate the value func-
tion solving the generalized Bellman equation (12) and obtain the corre-
sponding optimal policy functions.37 Kato and Nishiyama (2005) in earlier
work use the collocation method for solving a standard Bellman equation of
a backward looking model.




⊂ R4 i n t oas e to fN col-
location nodes ℵ = {sn|n =1 ,...,N},w h e r esn ∈ S. One then interpolates
the value function over these collocation nodes by choosing basis coeﬃcients





at each node sn ∈ℵ ,w h e r eζ(·) is a four dimensional cubic spline function.
Equation (18) is an approximation to the left-hand side of (12). Then to
evaluate the right-hand side of (12) one has to approximate the expected
value EW(t(sn,x 1,x 2,ε)),w h e r et(·) denotes the state transition function,
x1 =( γ1,γ2) and x2 =( y,π,i) are the vectors of controls, and ε =( εu,ε g)
are the multivariate normal innovations of the shock processes. Assuming
37See chapter 11 in Judd (1998) and chapters 6 and 9 in Miranda and Fackler (2002)
for more detailed expositions.
22normality of the innovations, the expected value function can be approx-
imated by Gaussian-Hermite quadrature, which involves discretizing the
shock distribution into a set of quadrature nodes εm and associated proba-
bility weights ωm (m =1 ,...,M).38
Substituting the collocation equation (18) for the value function W(t(·)),











ωmcnζj(t(sn,x 1,x 2,ε m))}
at each node sn ∈ℵ . The minimization/maximization problem (19) can be
implemented using standard Newton methods, taking into account that i ≥
−r∗. This delivers RHSc(·) and the policy functions x1c(·) and x2c(·) at the
collocation nodes. Using the collocation technique one can then approximate
RHSc(·) by a new set of basis coeﬃcients c0






at each node sn ∈ℵ .
Equations (18), (19), and (20) together deﬁne the iteration
c → Φ(c) (21)
where c is the initial vector of basis coeﬃcients in (18) and Φ(c) the vector
of basis coeﬃcient c0 in (20). The ﬁxed point of equation (12) satisﬁes
c∗ = Φ(c∗).T os o l v ef o rt h i sﬁxed point the algorithm proceeds as follows:
Step 1 Choose the degree of approximation N and M, and collocation and
quadrature nodes. Guess an initial basis coeﬃcient vector c0.
Step 2 Iterate on equation (21) and update the basis function coeﬃcient vec-
tor ck to ck+1.
Step 3 Stop if
¯ ¯ck+1 − ck¯ ¯
max <τ,w h e r eτ>0 is a tolerance level and |·|max
denotes the maximum absolute norm. Otherwise repeat step 2.
38See chapter 7 in Judd (1998) for details.
23Once convergence is achieved and the (approximate) ﬁxed point c∗ is







where s ∈ℵ ε = {sn|n =1 ,...,Nε} is a grid of nodes for which ℵε ∩ℵ= ∅.
Then compute the maximum absolute approximation error
eabs =m a x
s∈ℵε |Rc∗(s)|
and the maximum relative approximation error
erel =m a x
s∈ℵε






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
For the baseline parameterization we set N =6 8 7 5and M =9 ,w i t h
relatively more nodes placed into the area of the state space where the policy
functions display kinks. The support of the discretization is chosen so as to
cover ±4 unconditional standard deviations of the exogenous states u and g,
and to insure that in a long simulation of 106 periods all values for μ1 and μ2
fall inside the chosen support. Since the latter can only be veriﬁed ex-post,
i.e., after having obtained the solution, some experimentation is necessary.
Our initial guess for c0 is consistent with the solution of the problem
without lower bound. The tolerance level is set to τ =1 .49 · 10−8, i.e.,
the square root of machine precision. Convergence is reached after about
39 hours on a Pentium IV with 2.6 GHz. The approximation errors are
eabs =0 .0021 and erel =0 .0027,w h e r eℵε contained more than 75000 nodes.
A.4 Identiﬁcation of historical shocks (RBC calibration)
We re-estimated the shock processes using the parameters from table 2 to-
gether with VAR-based expectations, following the procedure described in
appendix A.1. The autocorrelation coeﬃcient for the mark-up shocks now
turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Therefore, in table 2
we set ρu equal to its point estimate. The point estimate (standard devia-
tion) of the autocorrelation of the real rate shocks is now ρg =0 .882 (0.059).
Since we still cannot reject ρg =0 .8 at conventional signiﬁcance levels, we
24keep this value of the baseline parameterization. As before, the standard
deviation σg of the innovation εg,t is chosen so as to match the standard
deviation of the estimated real rate shocks.
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28Parameter Economic interpretation Assigned value






σ real rate elasticity of output 6.25
α share of ﬁrms keeping prices ﬁxed 0.66
θ price elasticity of demand 7.66
ω elasticity of ﬁrms’ marginal costs 0.47
κ slope of the Phillips curve 0.024
λ weight on output in the loss function 0.048
42 =0 .003
ρu AR-coeﬃcient mark-up shocks 0
ρg AR-coeﬃcient real rate shocks 0.8
σu s.d. mark-up shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.154
σg s.d. real rate shock innovations (quarterly %) 1.524
Table 1: Parameter values (baseline calibration)
Parameter Economic interpretation Assigned value






σ real rate elasticity of output 1
α share of ﬁrms keeping prices ﬁxed 0.66
θ price elasticity of demand 7.66
ω elasticity of ﬁrms’ marginal costs 0.47
κ slope of the Phillips curve 0.057
λ weight on output in the loss function 0.007
ρu AR-coeﬃcient mark-up shocks 0.36
ρg AR-coeﬃcient real rate shocks 0.8
σu s.d. mark-up shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.171
σg s.d. real rate shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.294
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Figure 2: Residual autocorrelations with 2 s.d. error bounds for an unre-
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Figure 4: Optimal policy responses (baseline calibration)















Figure 5: More aggressive easing with lower bound (baseline calibration)
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Figure 6: Mean response to ±3 s.d. real rate shocks (baseline calibration)























Figure 7: Persistence of zero interest rates (baseline calibration)




































Figure 8: Asymmetric real rate response with lower bound (3-fold variance
of real rate shocks)
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Figure 9: Mean response to ±3 s.d. mark-up shock (3-fold variance of real
rate shocks)
















































































Figure 10: Sensitivity to the variance of real rate shocks
39